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Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45 By Max Hastings ( Knopf )
Release Date: 2008-03-18
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Product Description
Hailed in Britain as “Spectacular . . . Searingly powerful” (Andrew Roberts, The Sunday Telegraph), a riveting, impeccably informed chronicle of the final year of the Pacific war. In his critically acclaimed Armageddon, Hastings detailed the last twelve months of the struggle for Germany. Here, in what can be considered a companion volume, he covers the horrific story of the war against Japan.
By the summer of 1944 it was clear that Japan’s defeat was inevitable, but how the drive to victory would be achieved remained to be seen. The ensuing drama—that ended in Japan’s utter devastation—was acted out across the vast stage of Asia, with massive clashes of naval and air forces, fighting through jungles, and barbarities by an apparently incomprehensible foe. In recounting the saga of this time and place, Max Hastings gives us incisive portraits of the theater’s key figures—MacArthur, Nimitz, Mountbatten, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. But he is equally adept in his portrayals of the ordinary soldiers and sailors—American, British, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese—caught in some of the war’s bloodiest campaigns.
With unprecedented insight, Hastings discusses Japan’s war against China, now all but forgotten in the West, MacArthur’s follies in the Philippines, the Marines at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and the Soviet blitzkrieg in Manchuria. He analyzes the decision-making process that led to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—which, he convincingly argues, ultimately saved lives. Finally, he delves into the Japanese wartime mind-set, which caused an otherwise civilized society to carry out atrocities that haunt the nation to this day.
Retribution is a brilliant telling of an epic conflict from a master military historian at the height of his powers.
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 A Fascinating Book!
Max Hastings, Retribution; the Battle for Japan, 1944-45
The author describes the last year of the war against Japan, which had started on 18th, September 1931, when Japanese troops attacked Manchuria. However, this was just the beginning of their conquests, which up to December 1941 included large portions of China, and the whole Korean Peninsula. To stop the Japanese expansion, which was accompanied with so far unheard of atrocities against the captured soldiers as well as toward the occupied populations, the USA imposed progressively tighter embargoes on industrial goods and raw materials exported to Japan. Since this might actually stop the Japanese war machine and prevent their further conquests, the Japanese committed a fateful move by attacking Pearl Harbor.
The architect of this assault was the competent Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. He had studied at Harvard and served several years as the naval attaché in Washington D.C. Knowing well enough the strength of the USA and their mighty industrial potential, he at first opposed the planned adventure. But, as an obedient soldier, he nevertheless carried out the order to attack. His plan was to destroy the main US Pacific fleet with a single decisive blow, by attacking Pearl Harbor, where - at the time of the attack - the major part of US Pacific fleet should be anchored. If successful, then Japan would have a half to one year's time to expand her possessions. Then the Japanese Government should offer acceptable terms for peace, before the USA, supported by its enormous industrial power, would start reversing the process. He almost succeeded, but on December 7, 1941, when the attack was launched, no US airplane carriers were in Pearl Harbor. And just those carriers, plus others, built in 1942-45, together with submarines and other navy vessels as well as the new B29 Superfortress bombers were decisive in achieving the eventual Japanese defeat.
After crippling the US Navy in Pearl Harbor the Japanese hastily began fulfilling their plans. In the following three years they occupied all important Pacific harbors of China, French Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes, Philippines, a larger part of New Guinea and some smaller Pacific islands, all the way from the Aleutians in the north, down to Gilbert and Salomon Islands in the south. The "Battle of Coral Sea" (in May 7, 1942) was the turning point, followed by the massive defeat of the Japanese Navy in the "Battle of Midway" (in June 4, 1942). Then the circumstances became ripe to beat Japanese for good.
To liberate such a vast occupied area and press the Japanese to surrender, the leaders of the British-, Chinese-, Australian-, American- and other armies, had basically different ideas of how (and why) to achieve their ultimate goal. The most straightforward was the American plan. After the B-29 bombers began their massive air raids on Japan in 1945, their plan was to bomb the "Country of Rising Sun" into the Stone Age and starve the population by the navy and submarine blockade to such extent, that the assault on the main Japanese islands would probably not be necessary in order to achieve capitulation. (At that time the knowledge that an atomic bomb was being developed was limited just to few US leaders).
However, even on the US side General Douglas McArthur wanted to liberate the Philippines before the main assault on Japan. When he was forced to escape these islands on March 11, 1942, he promised to return and he wanted to keep his word no matter what the cost. It is easy to understand that all nations suffering under Japanese occupation would prefer to be liberated first, before attacking Japan proper. The British, French and Dutch, which had their colonies in Asia, would prefer to get them back as soon as possible. For Mao Zedong in China the preference was to establish a Communist system in his country, while the struggle against the Japanese was of secondary importance. On the other hand, for the Chinese nationalist leader Chang Kai-shek the most important thing was to get rid of the Japanese (and to prevent Mao fulfilling his plans) but the effectiveness of his actions was excessively impaired by the corruption and incompetence of his army. For Australians the price to continue fighting the Japanese, who had bombed Darwin and Broome in 1942, seemed too high, after the occupied islands in their immediate north were liberated. In short, the main burden of final assault on Japan lay on the shoulders of the Americans. And even among them the Army, Navy and Air Forces had different concepts of how this should be carried out.
From the book we learn of discords and concords among the allies, of enormous cost in blood and material for the liberation of Philippines, and of the stubbornness of the Japanese, who were fighting almost to the last soldier. Their leaders were harboring the false idea that the Americans would not dare to attack the main Japanese islands, because they were already paying an extremely high price in blood, when conquering the Philippines and minor islands in Pacific.
It became clear that the Japanese military leadership has lost the main objective - that the Army is to defend their people. Instead - to "save face" - their Army intended to perish together with their people. When in the beginning of 1945 it became obvious that Japan will be defeated, they kept fighting, neglecting the lives of their soldiers, of their own people and even more so the lives of peoples under their occupation.
Though the Japanese were brave soldiers, the author concludes that their leaders were mainly moral cowards. They did not have the guts to admit to their own people, that the war was lost, and stop the senseless bloodshed. Even when confronted with the fact of both atomic bombs, which were dropped in August 6th and 9th, and the Russian assault of August 8th on Manchuria, the Japanese Government remained indecisive. (The total number of deaths due to atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was approximately equal to the number of Nanking citizens, massacred by the Japanese in January 1937.) It was Emperor Hirohito, who eventually tilted the scale (in mid August) by accepting the terms of capitulation - providing it would not affect the Emperor and the members of his family. To stop the senseless further carnage, the Americans accepted, though this was not an unconditional surrender.
The author describes in great detail the struggles in continental Asia, on Pacific Sea and islands, and the bombing of Japan. His vivid description of living conditions of people and soldiers on all sides is excellent. The book is probably the best information of the final year of the war against Japan, which can be found in a single volume.
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History in a Grand Scale ( agusting )
The history of the last years of the Pacific War is expansive,so many details, so much to tell. I think the author did a wonderful job in telling in a thorough but readable fashion this history.
The portrait he paints of Douglas MacArthur is unflattering and this may cause some concern with American readers as he is one of their main heroes but I can readily credit this portrait as men with huge egos and great responsibilities many times act for the preservation of their image to posterity even against the best interest of their nation as a whole. We are presented with a rather inept handling of the Phillipines campaign that cost the American military many unnecesary lives and suffering as the islands could have been by-passed as suggested by Adm. Nimitz. In the end Manila got the worst as the Japanese vented their vengeance in the unarmed civilians and the city itself was subjected to destruction in the fighting.
We are presented with the ineptitude of the japanese Navy that readily caused its demise in the Leyte Battle without getting any visible results and loosing the Battleship Musashi and many carriers in a flawed plan. This battle also gave a bad reputation to Adm. Halsey as he recklessly abandoned the San Bernardino Straits to pursue a decoy fleet of japanese carriers led by Adm. Ozawa but that didn't have planes and did not represented a real threat to the American navy. This in turn produced the battle of Samar as the main Japanese navy encountered no resistance in the part of Seventh Fleet in San Bernardino and found the Taffy 2 group almost defenseless and American destroyers and escort carriers had to fight heroically a fleet of japanese dreadnouts including Battleship Yamato that produced many casualties among the small American ships. If Adm. Kurita in command of the japanese main fleet had more stomach for fighting he could have destroyed the entire American invasion fleet at anchor at Leyte but chose to retire again through san Bernardino accomplishing almost nothing. The japanese fleets that attacked through the Northern route were totally destroyed by Adm Kincaid's Battleships (some of them survivors of Pearl Harbor) to add to the pathetic handling of this battle by the japanese that in the last year of the war seemed to do everything wrong. The only visible damage done to the American fleets was done by the japanese Kamikaze suicide pilots in a strategy that will create in the end one of the conditions for the release of the atomic bombs.
We are confronted with the British campaign on Burma led by Field Marshall Slim that was heroic and well led but ultimately futile as it did not contribute in a great fashion to the overall victory but gave the British some consolation to the dismal fashion in which they at first conduted their part of the war.
The campaigns of Iwo Jima and Okinawa are reviewed in all of their gory details. Also the extensive destruction brought forward by the B29 bombing campaign that reduced to rubble Tokyo and many important cities in japan.
We are confronted with the fact that Japan itself was almost at the brink of starvation as the American submarine campaign destroyed most of their merchant navy and that this if continued could have led to the ultimate submission of Japan. Japanese main armies were stationed in China and Korea and continued to provide victories against the Chinese Kuommingtang army almost to the end of the war thus making a necessity to bring the Soviet Union to the war in order to deal with these huge field armies. The Soviet invasion was devastating especially for the civilian population that were systematically plundered and raped by the Soviet victors.
In the end the japanese military even confronted with the destruction of their main fleets, the devastation of their cities, the starvation of the citizens did not want to concede victory to the allies thus making necessary the use of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese army was ready to fight to the death defending the homeland in the event of an allied invasion that could have cost the Americans espcially millions of casualties. There are some scholars that think the use of the atom bombs was unnecessary and that the ultimate surrender of Japan was just a matter of time but I believe cool heads were not the norm in the japanese Army's high command and that the atomic bombing was the price to pay in order to make the japanese leadership to see some reason and not think just in terms of honor or saving face. In the end Anami and the Japanese Army's leadership brought destruction to their countrymen for their inhability to see the truth.
Great read and a real eye openner to the end of this great conflict that still shapes the way we are living today.
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 Riddled with errors
Hastings is one of the best authors of our time, and I have thoroughly enjoyed his previous works. So I eagerly awaited this selection by the History Book Club, in part to see what was advertised as his defense of the use of firebombing and the atomic bombs, a rarity in academe these days, but a position with which I agree. When it did, as I typically do, I did not start at the beginning, but went to what should have been my favorite part of the book, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, to see what novel ideas and theories he has.
And Hastings does have some novel ideas and theories. See if you notice a pattern:
Page 132: "[In October 1944] The Imperial Navy still disposed a force which, a few years past, had awed the world. Of ten battleships in commission at the start of the war, nine remained."
At the start of the war, the Japanese had ten battleships. In October 1944, they had nine. That much is true. The problem is not all of those nine were in commission at the start of the war. Of those ten that were, three were sunk: Hiei and Kirishima were sunk during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and the Mutsu sunk after she exploded under mysterious circumstances at Hashirajima anchorage. So seven of that original ten were still in service. Two more were completed after the start of the war: Yamato and Musashi.
Starting on page 132: Hastings calls the Japanese operational plan at Leyte Gulf "Shogo" -- "Operation Victory." I have seen it referred to as "Sho Go," "Sho-Go," "Sho-I-Go" or Sho-Ichi-Go" ("ichi" meaning "one" -- the plan for Leyte Gulf was "Sho 1"). I have never seen it called "Shogo" before.
Page 135: The submarine attack on Kurita's Center Force off Palawan by US submariens Darter and Dace. Hastings says, "This first American success was made possible by a tactical carelessness amounting to recklessness [...]" without giving elaboration. This amounts to a drive-by. In truth, the Darter ended up running aground on Bombay Shoal and had to be destroyed after the crew was taken off by the Dace.
Page 138: Hastings claims that light cruiser Noshiro was sunk by US carrier aircraft during Kurita's transit through the Sibuyan Sea on October 24. During this enounter, the Musashi was sunk and the heavy cruiser Myoko so badly damaged she had to retire.
Page 159: Hastings claims that the light cruiser Noshiro was sunk again on October 26 as Kurita retreated through the Sibuyan Sea. In truth, this was when the Noshiro was actually sunk. She was undamaged during the attacks on October 24.
Page 144: Hastings touches on the entire "Fuso-Yamashiro thing" -- the controversey over which battleship was sunk where in the Battle of Surigao Strait. Hastings claims that Jesse Coward's eastern destroyers launched torpedoes and at 3:08 am "heard a single explosion aboard a Japanese ship, probably Yamashiro." He later states that a torpedo from the Monssen of Coward's western destroyers left the Yamashiro "crippled," and continues:
The next American destroyer attack, by Squadron 24, probably achieved two hits. It is still disputed whether battleship gunfire or torpedoes were responsible, but what is certain is that the battleship Fuso, laid down in 1912, caught fire and broke in two after a huge explosion. Bewilderment persists about how readily such a hugh ship succumbed, but senility plaintly rendered it vulnerable.
The Fuso-Yamashiro controversy involves whether or not the Fuso took a torpedo hit at about 3:09 am (Hastings says 3:08) from the destroyer Melvin of Coward's destroyer group. No one that I am aware of has alleged that Yamashiro took that torpedo hit at that time. Moreover, the account from the Melvin alleged "two large and separate explosions seen." It was Japanese heavy seaplane cruiser Mogami that saw only one explosion.
There is indeed a dispute as to whether Fuso was sunk by torpedoes or gunfire, as Hastings claims, but the dispute concerns whether she took that torpedo and dropped out to explode and break in two, or if it was Yamashiro that dropped out to explode and break in two while Fuso continued onward to face the US battleline where she would receive concentrated gunfire from US battleships and cruisers.
By Hastings' description, Fuso has taken no gunfire, and the tropedo hit that she is believed to have received Hastings instead says was received by the Yamashiro. By Hastings' timeline, Fuso has taken no definite damage. Hastiongs has garbled the controversy and, in the process, garblesd the account of the Battle of Surigao Strait.
Pages 146 and 147: Hastings' timeline of Shima's torpedo atatck is also all wrong. Hastings has Shima launching a torpedo attack on radar contacts that turned out to be the Hibuson Islands (the humor of war), then seeing the two burning halves of the Fuso, mistaking them for separate ships. At that point he turned his force around, during which time his flagship Nachi collided with the Mogami.
What actually happened is that Shima saw the Fuso, mistaking the two halves to be burning ships, and the burning Mogami. Passing the Fuso, he saw the radar contacts and decided to launch a torpedo attack on them while hiding behind the glare of the Mogami. he mistook Mogami to be stationary when she was moving southward, and the Nachi then "skidded" into the Mogami. Aftwer receiving this damage, as well as the earlier torpedoing of the light cruiser Abukuma, and with no definite intelligence aside from the apparent annihilation of Nishimura's force, Shima withdrew.
Page 156: Hastings continually gets the names of two of Taffy 3's escort carriers wrong. He calls the Kitkun Bay the "Kitgun Bay" and the Kalinin Bay the "Kallin Bay."
Page 157: Hastings states the Japanese heavy seaplane cruiser Chikuma was sunk by bombs and aerial torpedoes. He goes on to describe the sinking by Japanese gunfire of the US escort carrier Gambier Bay. Except the Gambier Bay was sunk by the Chikuma; several pictures from the battle off Samar show the Gambier Bay under fire with the Chikuma vuisible in the distance. Hastings messed up the timeline again.
These are just the mistakes and omissions I found in one chapter. Basic things like events, timelines and ship names. Is this the result of poor editing or poor research?
What other factual errors are hidden in this book? Can I trust Hastings general writing, themes and opinions (usally very, very good) when there is so much erroneous with this thin slice?
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 Retribution ( slppbm )
retribution there is an awe inspiring confusion by the author of laquerware and porcelin the former being made from wood, the latter of fire clay this collossal error makes on wonder what other clumsiness lurks in the book. this is in the chapter on okinowa Palmer Madden
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A Brilliant Account of the Final Year of the Pacific War ( truphil )
For those of us who fought in the Pacific during World War II, one wonders what more can be said that has not been previously written about by dozens of authors, from grand overall strategic reviews to those of individuals. The British journalist-historian Max Hastings, who has written extensively on war and in particular the Second World War, has succeeded in brilliant fashion to examine the last year of the Pacific war, combining battle accounts flavored by interviews with participants, to produce a riveting analysis of the strategic decisions and tactics used, and from this to produce sharp judgments about these decisions and those in charge.
In Hastings' account there are fascinating details little covered by others writers. These include the important role played by U.S. subs in sinking Japanese shipping, so vital to Japan's war-making powers. The shadow war in China where Mao and his cohorts in Yenan's caves did little to attack Japanese forces, waiting till the war's end to renew their battle with the Chinese Nationalists. Hastings' view of Chiang Kai-shek and his largely toothless armies is likewise largely negative. He is also critical, unfairly in my view, of the State Department Foreign Service officers in China whose reports to policymakers on the relative strength and popularity of the Chinese Communists compared to those of the Nationalist government were more favorable to Mao's guerrilla forces. He has pages about the non-military nonchalance of Naval aviators, to the concern of their superior officers, but also praise for their contributions in defeating Japan's naval power and its carrier air wing. Other interesting sidelights include the Soviet Union's invasion of Manchuria, the forgotten campaign of British General Slim--who Hastings' admires--in recapturing Burma, and the non-use of Australian forces in the last years of the war.
Hastings is critical of both leaders and tactics. He has little use for the showmanship and sometimes deceit of General Douglas MacArthur. Nor does he much good to say about Lord Louis Mountbatten. The author suggest, a bit unconvincely, that the entire Philippines campaign was more about MacArthur's own retribution for his failures after Pearl Harbor in defending Manila. In contrast, he has great admiration for Admiral Chester Nimitz and his leadership of the U.S. Navy. He believes, as others have, that the long and costly battle the Marines fought for Peleliu was not needed in that the importance of the island for Japanese aircraft to attack the Philippines had disappeared by the time the invasion took place. He also suggests that Iwo Jima may not have been necessary either, though many a B-29 crewmen who landed there, as did I on three occasions, would disagree. Although he is critical of the human suffering in Japan caused by the B-29 air campaign against urban target, he also believes that Japan would not have surrendered without the twin blows of the B-29 bombing attacks, ending with the dropping of the atomic bombs. He therefore allies himself with Richard Frank and other historians as to the necessity of the bombing, and has scant regard for revisionist historians who believe Japan would have surrendered without the bombing campaign, climaxed by the dropping of the A-bombs. Anyone who was in the Pacific either engaged against Japan or transferring from the European theater to be part of the invasion force held the opposite view--an immense sense of relief and joy when the overwhelming blows from the air, in addition to the virtual elimination of Japan's naval forces, caused Japan at last to accept unconditional surrender. As one who was interviewed by Max Hastings for this book, it is an honor to be cited in this candid and highly informative analysis of the final tragic months of the Pacific war.
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