Product Description
As it celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, the State of Israel could count many important successes, but its conflict with the Palestinians and the Arab world at large casts a long shadow over its history. What was promulgated as an "iron-wall" strategy--dealing with the Arabs from a position of unassailable strength--was meant to yield to a further stage where Israel would be strong enough to negotiate a satisfactory peace with its neighbors. The goal remains elusive. In this penetrating study, Avi Shlaim examines how variations of the iron-wall philosophy have guided Israel's leaders; he finds that, while the strategy has been successful, opportunities have been lost to progress from military security to broader peace. The Iron Wall brilliantly illuminates past progress and future prospects for peace in the Middle East.Maps, 18 pages of photographs.
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Amazon.com Review
In 1897, under order of First Zionist Congress president Theodor Herzl, two Austrian rabbis traveled to Palestine to explore the possibility of locating a Jewish state there. "The bride is beautiful," the rabbis cabled Herzl, "but she is married to another man." That "other man" was the Palestinian Arab nation, long established in the region as a political entity. Undeterred, Herzl pressed on with his program of emigration, ignoring Palestine's existing occupants and creating in the process what came to be known as the "Arab question." In this far-ranging history, Avi Shlaim analyzes that question in remarkable detail, tracing the shifting policies of Israel toward the Palestinians and the Arab world at large. Herzl, he writes, followed a policy that consciously sought to enlist the great powers--principally Britain and later the United States--while dismissing indigenous claims to sovereignty; after all, Herzl argued, "the Arab problem paled in significance compared with the Jewish problem because the Arabs had vast spaces outside Palestine, whereas for the Jews, who were being persecuted in Europe, Palestine constituted the only possible haven." This policy later changed to a stance of confrontation against the admittedly hostile surrounding Arab powers, especially Syria, Jordan, and Egypt; this militant stance was a source of controversy in the international community, and it also divided Israelis into hawk and dove factions. The intransigence of those hawks, Shlaim shows, served to alienate Israel and made it possible for the Palestine Liberation Organization and other Arab nationalist groups to enlist the support of the great powers that Herzl had long before courted. Both sides, in turn, had eventually to face the "historic compromise" that led to the present peace in the Middle East--a peace that, the author suggests, may not endure. --Gregory McNamee
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 An honest look at a complex history ( ausgeziegnet )
I originally bought this book more than a year ago, but I put off reading it because it was published in 2000 which meant that it wouldn't discuss some of the extremely important events that have occurred in the last 9 to 10 years. So, I continued to put this book on the backburner while I read more recent works. What I found, though, was that more and more of these recent works quoted Avi Shlaim's account. The more and more I found this book to be referenced by historians of today, the harder it became for me to ignore this book. Last month I finally picked up this important book and began to read this author's preeminent account of Israeli history. I have been greatly awarded for my effort.
It reaffirmed some of the conclusions I had come hold, while at the same time challenging others. This is the importance of this book. It doesn't take sides, and the author spreads the blame for the current (and the past) impasse on all sides. The fact is that there is more than enough blame to go around, but what was interesting was how so much of this conflict was due to nothing more than misunderstandings and each side's inability to view the situation from the other's perspective. So much of this conflict was perpetuated by nothing more than the ruling elites being forced into political and military blunders by domestic political situations. Whether it is Nasser's gross miscalculation in militarizing and closing off the Straits of Tiran to shore up his reputation in Egypt and the larger Arab world, or whether it was Peres' assassination of Yahya Ayyash to toughen up his reputation before Israeli elections, much of this conflict has its roots in bad decisions made by political elites in the hopes of retaining power.
Another reason this book struck me was the inherent weakness when it comes to Democratic states and diplomacy. For the two main democratic states in this story, Israel and the U.S., their policies varied wildly from one election to the next. This is very well illustrated by the Carter to Reagan to Bush administrations in the U.S., and is equally illustrated by the Rabin to Peres to Netanyahu in Israel. This schizophrenic diplomacy pursued by the democracies contrasts amazingly with the consistency of the regimes of Jordan and Syria, and magnifies the problems in dealing consistently with states whose foreign policy can change so dramatically every few years. I found this contrast to be enlightening and very informative of how and why this conflict has seen so many ups and downs over the years.
This is a very complex and convoluted issue, and any work that attempts to take an honest look at the issues and the history will be a help to any reader in making sense of this conflict. This book is that honest attempt, and that is why it is so important.
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 Worthless ( bikodish )
This post-Zionist drivel will confirm the delusions of lefties and arabists who don't want to learn anything about the actual history.
Study the author for insights into the masochistic omnipotence that plagues Jewish leftists and gives so much encouragement to those who want to destroy Israel.
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 Detailed, novel, but profoundly coloured by his anti-Zionism ( charles_soper )
As one would expect from a radical revisionist historian Shlaim has reputation to make by subverting the orthodox. Many of his observations are detailed and interesting - and purport to show how many opportunities Israel has missed to negotiate with its neighbours. Since the author was present in 1967, and plainly has an intimate familiarity with his source documents - his writing naturally therefore seems authoritative.
Nevertheless, I had a constant sense of hearing only half the narrative whilst reading the book. As though his determination to revise the history he was determined to change had blinkered him to the realities of the amply documented Arab intent to utterly annihilate Israel, in 67 particularly.
His leading participation in the 2005 Oxford Union debate 'Is Zionism today the real enemy of the Jews?' marks him out as a vocal and active anti-Zionist - and therefore hardly well qualified to write an objective history.
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The appraisal is fair.... ( mardelli )
The appraisal is fair.
The Author was not fooling with the Lavon affair. He decided, with more discretion and valor, to attribute it all to Ben-Gurion's machinations.
The hawkish branch of the Israeli leadership has always had to compensate for its political defeat at home through finding the deficiencies of others as cover up.
Ben-Gurion believed that his superficial knowledge of Egypt in general, and of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular would lend him credence to any action he took to convince `The West' that terrorism works were being masterminded by the fundamentalist Muslims against the Jews and Christian minorities.
Greater only than his aversion to the Palestinians was Ben-Gurion aversion to Nasser who was a newcomer junior lieutenant and represented the reforming tendencies in Egypt and the Arab world. Ben-Gurion was afraid of those reforming tendencies lest Egypt would be `extravagantly' feted so much for her magnificent influence, which seemed a reassuring symbol of her leadership.
When Sharett refused him permission to resort to force, etiquette did not give way to the natural quality of that oriental Jew whose expression so often succeed to endear him to the Arabs. Egyptian Jewish minorities were the unfortunate victims of Ben-Gurion's political intransigence and military adventurism, and the Lavon affair was its apex.
In his mid thirties the tall and heavily built Nasser, with `oval' face, protruded lower jaws, a `fellah' haircut shaved so close to the scalp it made him look older. His expression was serious and gave the misleading impression he was uncompromising. Nasser was equally aware of his political inexperience but proud of Egypt as a cohesive nation always ready to assume the leadership role of the Arabs.
To Nasser no tragedy could be greater than military defeat between the `great and proud' Egypt and the `tiny' Israel. When the reformist Nasser spoke of Israel he was speaking more from instinct than from reason, whereas the expansionist Ben-Gurion had more reason for being intransigent.
Ben-Gurion must have been vindicated when King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated. His demise was indeed the beginning of the end of moderation.
Hosni el Zaeem of Syria (1949), King Abdullah of Jordan (1951), Naguib and Nasser of Egypt (1953-1955) all advocated moderation and sought `settlement' of the Arab-Israeli debacle, whereas the Hawkish Leadership in Israel was only looking for `solutions' - Temporary solutions!!
Perhaps the most moderate era was the one during the Egyptian Royal Court. King Farouk regarded `his' defeat in 1948 as a personal insult. His caustic manner and tendency to bad temper and impolite language began when his overtures to find a viable `settlement' with the Israelis was also declined. Farouk was no more pleased to the new `neighbor' than his colleagues (and Israel) were to have him as the Arab Leader.
The cult of arrogance practiced by the Israeli leadership after its short-term military successes affected, in the long run, no one painfully than itself.
Israel, though admittedly intelligent and hard working, is described by its neighbors as rude, tactless, disputatious and given to domineering and expansionist manners.
But once divinity of Israel's doctrine has been questioned there is no return to perfect faith. The impression they transpired to everyone is one of uncertainties and emotions, tormented by indecisiveness whenever a decision for `peaceful settlement' was required.
On the other hand, aggravated by their bitterness and despair - not a pleasing prospect for a vigorous Arab world with an appetite for `a fair settlement' and whose excessive passions for progress had caused one regime to be deposed and another to take its place, the Arabs continue to give the false impression of intransigence, for uncompromising Israel to look moderate.
Pity that little thought is given to what wars did to the minds and to the national psyche of all the peoples living in this beautiful and fruitful part of the world.
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The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World ( emmoran2 )
This book contains correct information presented from a viewpoint that may undermine rather than contribute to real efforts for a piece in the Middle East.
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